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Abstract: 
Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago. Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian 
insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality. Searle maintains that so-called Status Function 
Declarations, allegedly having a “double direction of fit” (i.e. a world-to-word and a word-to-world direction of 
fit), synchronically create worldly institutional facts, corresponding to the propositional content of the 
declarations. I argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is in tension with the special 
theory of relativity – irrespective of whether the account is interpreted as involving causal generation or non-
causal grounding of worldly institutional facts – and should be replaced by a more modest theory which 
interprets the results of Status Function Declarations in terms of mere Cambridge change and institutional truth. I 
end the paper by indicating the import of this more modest theory for theorizing about the causal potency of 




John Searle famously maintains that all of institutional reality is created by “Status Function 
Declarations” (Searle 2010:13, 93, 99). Status Function Declarations fall into the category 
“extralinguistic declarations”, a category of speech acts that Searle distinguishes from mere 
“linguistic declarations” (Searle 1989: 549, 554-555; 2010: 110-114). Linguistic declarations 
create speech acts (such as promises, statements and orders), but extralinguistic declarations 
create extralinguistic facts and entities in the world. Extralinguistic declarations are, 
conceptually, of two kinds: supernatural declarations and Status Function Declarations (Searle 
1975/1979: 18; 1989: 549-550; 2010: 100). Although we cannot, as human beings, 
successfully perform supernatural declarations, we can, according to Searle, change the world 
and create institutional facts and objects through Status Function Declarations.  
In Searle’s own words:  
 
Naively the best way to think of the distinction [between linguistic and extralinguistic 
declarations] is this: A declaration is a speech act whose point is to create a new fact 
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corresponding to the propositional content. Sometimes those new facts are themselves 
speech acts such as promises, statements, orders, etc. These I am calling linguistic 
declarations. Sometimes the new facts are not further speech acts, but wars, marriages, 
adjournments, light, property transfers, etc. These I am calling extralinguistic 
declarations. […] When God says, “Let there be light!”, that I take it is a declaration. 
[…] It makes it the case by fiat that light exists. […] We ordinary humans do not have 
the ability to perform supernatural declarations, but we do have a quasi-magical power 
nonetheless of bringing about changes in the world through our utterances. (Searle 
1989: 549) We can create boundaries, kings, and corporations by saying something 
equivalent to “Let this be a boundary!” “Let the oldest son be the king!” “Let there be a 
corporation!” […] in the nonlinguistic Status Function Declaration, we do more than 
represent: we create. (Searle 2010: 100, 114) 
 
Moreover, according to Searle, Status Function Declarations generate their worldly changes 
synchronically – that is, simultaneously with the performance or application of the relevant 
Status Function Declaration (Searle 1989: 556-557; 2010: 99). This should be contrasted with 
how directives and commissives, such as orders and promises, generate their worldly changes: 
such speech acts, if successful, have their characteristic worldly effects at later points in time 
(e.g. Searle 1975/1979: 14, 19).  
Searle is sometimes criticized on grounds that it is doubtful that all of institutional 
reality is created through declarations: much of institutional reality seems rather to evolve 
gradually and unintentionally, without the performance and acceptance of declarations (see 
e.g. Blackburn 2010; Epstein 2014; Lawson 2016). In this paper, I ignore this kind of 
criticism and focus instead on the kinds of example where Status Function Declarations 
intuitively do play an essential role.1 I argue that it is deeply problematic to speak of Status 
Function Declarations, such as verdicts, appointments, gradings, and incorporations, as 
literally “changing the world” – that is, as creating worldly “extralinguistic facts” (typically of 
the form, a’s having institutional property or status function Y) that “correspond” to the 
propositional content of the declarations, as claimed by Searle. The Searlean view is 
intuitively problematic already within a commonsensical Newtonian framework – what could 
the relevant mechanism be (cf. Effingham 2009: 253)? – but it is decisively troublesome 
within a relativistic setting. Famously, instantaneous causation between spatially separated 
 
1 Searle himself seeks to dispel such worries by defining “institutional” in terms of imposed status functions and 
by allowing implicit declarations (2010: 13, 21-23; 2014). 
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events is precluded in relativistic (Minkowskian) spacetime, meaning that a causal 
interpretation of Status Function Declarations (see e.g. Searle 1983: 171-173) is ruled out; and 
synchronic grounding of an institutional fact by a Status Function Declaration (cf. Searle 
1989; 2010: 4; Schaffer forthcoming) will, in a suitable reference frame in relativistic 
spacetime, involve backward grounding of the institutional fact, meaning that a grounding 
account of Status Function Declarations is in trouble too. To avoid such problems, it is 
preferable, I shall argue, to characterize the “results” of Status Function Declarations in terms 
of so-called mere Cambridge changes and institutional truths. This more modest 
conceptualization avoids giving a false picture of what happens when we perform Status 
Function Declarations and allows for simultaneous “generation” of institutional phenomena 
across reference frames, even within a relativistic framework. The conceptualization also has 
ramifications for the way we theorize the causal standing of the putative institutional 
phenomena. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: I begin by describing Searle’s theories of 
declarations and Status Function Declarations (Section 2). (Readers well acquainted with 
these theories may skip to Section 3.) I then criticize Searle’s theory of Status Function 
Declarations – first, when construed as involving causation, subsequently, when interpreted in 
terms of grounding – drawing on the special theory of relativity (STR), (Section 3). Following 
this, I develop an alternative account in which the notions of mere Cambridge change and 
institutional truth play a key role (Section 4). I conclude with some observations about the 
implications of the alternative account (Section 5).  
 
2. Declarations and Status Function Declarations 
Searle originally stated his general theory of declarations in his (1975/1979), where a 
taxonomy of illocutionary acts is developed.2 He explains:  
 
It is the defining characteristic of this class [of illocutionary acts] that the successful 
performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the 
propositional content and reality, successful performance guarantees that the 
propositional content corresponds to the world. […] Declarations bring about some 
alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of 
the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed. (Searle 1975/1979: 16-17) 
 
2 The taxonomy takes its cues from Austin’s pioneering How to Do Things with Words (1962) and Searle’s 
Speech Acts (1969).  
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“D” stands for declarational illocutionary force or point; the arrows indicate that declarations 
have both words-to-world and world-to-words direction of fit (as explained below); the null 
symbol indicates that there is no sincerity condition (this seems intuitively wrong, but for our 
purposes, this aspect can be ignored3); and “p” stands for the propositional content of the 
declaration.  
Searle explains what is involved in the idea that declarations have a “double direction of 
fit” by contrasting declarations with other types of illocutionary act. Thus, in Making the 
Social World (2010) he writes: 
 
Some speech acts [e.g. statements] function by purporting to represent how things are in 
the world. […] I think of these speech acts as hovering over the world and pointing 
down to it, as fitting or as failing to fit the world, as having what I call the word-to-
world direction of fit. I represent these with the downwards arrow ¯. […] 
 But there are lots of speech acts that are not in the business of trying to tell us 
how things are in the world. They are trying to change the world to match the content of 
the speech act. […] The order is aimed at causing obedience; the promise is aimed at 
causing fulfillment. […] I say of these cases that they have the world-to-word direction 
of fit. […] I represent the upward or world-to-word direction of fit with an upward 
arrow ­. […] 
 There is a fascinating class of speech acts that combine the word-to-world ¯ and 
the world-to-word ­ direction of fit, which have both directions of fit simultaneously in 
a single speech act ­¯. These are cases where we change reality to match the 
propositional content of the speech act and thus achieve world-to-word direction of fit. 
But, and this is the amazing part, we succeed in doing so because we represent the 
reality as being so changed. More than three decades ago, I baptized these as 
 
3 Searle seems to have retracted this view about the sincerity condition in later work (e.g. Searle 1983: 172; 
1989). 
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“Declarations.” They change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus 
bringing that state of affairs into existence. (Searle 2010: 11-12)    
 
As we saw in Sect. 1, some declarations bring speech acts of other kinds into existence.4 
Others bring extralinguistic phenomena into existence: these phenomena might (at least 
logically) be physical (created by “supernatural declarations”) or institutional (created by 
“Status Function Declarations”). In the rest of the paper, I focus on Status Function 
Declarations. 
In his (2010: 93), Searle maintains that the “general form” of Status Function 
Declarations is: 
 
We (or I) make it the case by Declaration that the Y status function exists. 
 
A status function is a function (i.e. “a cause that serves a purpose”, Searle 2006: 17; 2010: 59) 
with two special but interrelated features: 
 
First, […] they require collective intentionality, both for their initial creation and for 
their continued existence. And second, they are functions that a person or other entity 
has, not in virtue of physical structure, […] but in virtue of collective imposition and 
recognition of a status. (Searle 2010: 59; see also 1995: 40-51; 2010: 7, 102-104)  
 
Status functions, then, are additional to the physical powers or abilities of objects, and 
imposed on objects through Status Function Declarations. Their continued existence requires 
their ongoing acceptance or recognition by a plurality of individuals in the society in question 
(Searle does not specify how large the fraction of accepting individuals needs to be).  
By declaring a status function into existence, we create an institutional fact or state of 
affairs (e.g. Searle 2010: 93). Crucially, for Searle, a fact or state of affairs is not merely a 
true proposition or statement (Searle 1995: 205-206, 220). He rejects such a Fregean view of 
 
4E.g., if someone says “I order you to leave the room”, that person is, according to Searle, making a declaration 
with the following illocutionary structure: “Declare (that I order (that you leave the room))” (Searle 1989: 541). 
Thus, the declaration brings an order into existence. Moreover, the order is a “performative”, although the 
declaration is not (ibid..): the person explicitly utters “I order …”, but does not explicitly say “I declare…”. 
Thus, declarations can be implicit or non-performative in the sense that they need not token an explicit 
expression naming the illocutionary force of the speech act (this is true of other speech acts as well). Indeed, 
according to Searle, to perform a declaration we need not even explicitly utter (or, I take it, write) anything: “I 
need not say anything. Just pushing the beer in the direction of their new owners can be a [declarational] speech 
act” (Searle 2010: 89).  
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facts on the ground that “facts function causally in a way that true statements do not” (1995: 
205). Facts are rather worldly things to which true statements correspond (Searle 1995: 202); 
they are entities that make statements true:  
 
… the fact stated needs to be distinguished from the statement of it […] the whole point 
of having the notion of “fact” is to have a notion for that which stands outside the 
statement but which makes it true, or in virtue of which it is true, if it is true. (Searle 
1995: 2, 211, emphasis in original; see also Austin 1950/1979: 121-124)  
 
In some places Searle is content to describe such facts loosely as “conditions in the world” 
(Searle 1995: 211). In other places, he seems to accept a more specific and traditional 
understanding of facts or states of affairs (cf. e.g. Armstrong 1997): facts are “entities in the 
world that have a propositional structure” (e.g. Searle 2014: 19); that is, a fact is (I read Searle 
as saying) a structured entity consisting of an object with a certain feature or property (or a 
constellation of objects standing in certain relations to each other). On yet other occasions, 
Searle uses the term “fact” to denote various things, such as events, actions, speech acts, 
properties, and objects (e.g. Searle 1989: passim; 2010: passim; 2014: passim). Although 
these conceptions of factuality differ, it is clear that Searle wants to use “fact” to pick out a 
worldly – and potentially causal – entity (or condition or structured complex), as opposed to 
an abstract linguistic entity, such as a true proposition.  
Importantly, institutional facts are to be contrasted with brute facts (Searle 1995: 2, 27). 
Brute facts, such as Earth’s being 93 million miles from the sun, exist independently of any 
human institution.5 Institutional facts, such as Donald Trump’s being president of the U.S.,  
require institutions for their existence – where institutions are systems of “constitutive rules” 
(1969: 51; 1995: 28), or as Searle prefers to put it in his (2010: 10, 13): systems of Status 
Function Declarations.6 The essential point is that, “all institutional facts are created by the 
same logical operation: the creation of reality by representing it as existing” (Searle 2010: 
93). 
 
5 Searle is influenced here by Anscombe (1958).  
6 “Constitutive rules” paradigmatically take the form “X counts as Y in context C”; they should be contrasted 
with merely “regulative rules”, typically of the form “If Y do X” (Searle 1969: 33-36; 1995: 27-28; for critical 
discussion of the contrast, see Hindriks 2009). In his 2010-book, Searle analyses constitutive rules as cases of 
“standing declarations” with double direction of fit (2010: 13, 97). It transpires, then, that for Searle, declarations 
can be understood either as speech acts (events or actions), which are performed by individuals, or as rules (a 
kind of object), which are represented (accepted or recognized) by individuals. Thus, there is a kind of 
process/product-ambiguity in Searle’s notion of declaration.  
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The overall idea concerning institutional reality, then, is that statements about 
institutional reality are made true by institutional facts (Searle 1995: 221); and institutional 
facts are brought into existence by Status Function Declarations (Searle 2010: 13).7 
Before I move on I should point out the following. For Searle, there is a strong 
connection between status functions and so-called deontic powers, i.e., rights, duties, 
permissions, obligations, etc. (1995: 100-101; 2010: 8-9). Searle sometimes puts this by 
saying that “status functions carry deontic powers” (2010: 8). For example, a person who 
acquires the status function of being president of the Unites States thereby acquires certain 
rights and duties. But though there is a strong connection between status functions and 
deontic powers, they should not, I think, be identified on Searle’s scheme of things. For 
example, the status function of being money may be imposed on certain pieces of paper, but 
the associated right to use those pieces of paper as payment belongs to the owner of the 
money, not the paper items (1995: 95-96, 101; 2010: 101-102). Thus, status functions do not 
reduce to deontic powers, since status functions and their associated deontic powers may very 
well be had by distinct entities. 
It is also worth stressing that, for Searle, institutional facts, status functions and 
institutional objects do not exist in people’s minds (pace e.g. Johansson 2003: 247). 
Institutional phenomena somehow depend on mental phenomena of the kind involved in 
collective acceptance, or recognition, of Status Function Declarations, but they are not 
identical with those phenomena. As Searle puts it: “we need to introduce a class of 
phenomena [money, property, government, etc.] that are not actually located in our minds but 
are dependent on our attitudes.” (2010: 17, my emphasis) (Admittedly, there is a puzzling 
anti-realist strand in Searle’s writing about institutional reality which is somewhat hard to 
square with the views and formulations summarized and quoted above. For example, at 
various places he says that institutional facts are “ontologically subjective” (e.g. 2010: 18). I 
will return to this seemingly irrealist aspect of Searle’s theory at the end of Section 4.) 
 
7 The “general form” of Status Function Declarations (see above) can, according to Searle, be implemented in 
various ways (2010: 99-100): we can impose status functions on pre-existing objects (these are the paradigmatic 
cases) – either on an ad hoc basis, whereby constitutive rules about singular objects are in effect invented, or 
more systematically by involving general constitutive rules – and we can even create new objects like 
corporations “out of thin air” that have status functions (i.e., cases of so-called “freestanding Y terms”, 2006: 22; 
2010: 97-99). The various implementations will characteristically be of the following more specific forms: “We 
make it the case by Declaration that object X now has the status function Y in C […]  We make it the case by 
Declaration that for any x that satisfies condition p, x has the status Y and performs the function F in C […] We 
make it the case by Declaration that an entity Y exists that has status function(s) F in C.” (Searle 2010: 99-100)  
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Finally, it should be noted that spelled-out declarations are typically present-tensed, and 
often they contain indexicals like “now”.8 According to Searle, the present tense – or what he 
sometimes calls the “dramatic present” or the “present present” (1989: 556) – indicates that 
the creation of the represented fact, i.e. the event of creation, is simultaneous with the speech 
act:  
 
This tense is used to mark events which are, so to speak, to be construed as 
instantaneous with the utterance. […] In these cases, the sentence describes an event 
that is simultaneous with its utterance […] Now, because the performative utterance is 
both self-referential and executive, the present present is ideally suited to it. “I promise 
to come and see you” [or “We make it the case by Declaration that object X now has the 
status function Y in C”] marks an event [the making of a promise, the creation of an 
institutional fact] which is right then and there, simultaneous with the utterance, because 
the event is achieved by way of making the utterance. (Searle 1989: 556-557, my 
emphasis) 
 
This synchronicity thesis is arguably entailed by the “double direction of fit” idea. If the 
worldly institutional fact were created at some point after the completion of the declaration, 
we would apparently have a case of world-to-word direction of fit, ­; but according to Searle, 
in cases of declarations, we have ­¯.     
I will turn now to examine the consequences of taking seriously the idea that we can 
synchronically create extralinguistic, institutional facts through Status Function Declarations, 
and thereby literally change the world.9  
 
3. Bringing reality into correspondence with propositional content through Status 
Function Declarations? The lessons from STR  
Obviously, if someone utters something, the world thereby changes in the trivial sense that the 
very act of uttering is a process consisting of physical changes (the lips move, and so on). 
Clearly, however, this is not the kind of change Searle is talking about when he says that we 
 
8 This is illustrated, e.g., by the explicit forms of the various Status Function Declarations discussed by Searle; 
see note 7 above. 
9 Although I am primarily addressing Searle’s theory, I think the problems I point out generalize: arguably they 
afflict any theory of institutional reality involving synchronic generation of institutional properties/objects/facts, 
understood as real entities, across spatially extended regions. Some problematic cases in point will be mentioned 
along the way (e.g. Elder-Vass 2012; Hindriks 2013; Schaffer forthcoming); but see also e.g. Thomasson (2003), 
Baker (2007: 11-13), Hindriks (2009), and Smith (2014).    
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can change the world by making Status Function Declarations. There is nothing “amazing” 
(2010: 12), “quasi-magical” (1989: 549) or “god-like” (1983: 176) about such changes. 
Instead the idea is, as we have seen, that the world changes because an institutional fact 
(which, remember, is non-identical with a true proposition and with people’s mental states) 
begins to exist in the world when a Status Function Declaration is made – a fact which 
corresponds to the propositional content of the speech act and which serves as a truth-maker 
of the declaration, yielding the success both of the declaration’s world-to-word ­ direction of 
fit and its word-to-world ¯ direction of fit.10 Thus, Searle appears to be asserting that beyond 
the physical and mental changes involved in lip movements and shared recognition, 
something more is created. It is the creation of this additional feature or thing – specifically, a 
“status function”, such as being money, or an “institutional object”, such as a corporation – 
which constitutes the relevant change or event in the world, and which allows us to refer, 
quite literally, to the creation of an institutional fact.  
Let us take Searle at his word, and ask: Can the claim that institutional facts are created, 
or brought into existence, in the way he describes be reconciled with our best scientific 
theories of how the macroscopic world works11 – in particular, is it compatible with the tenets 
of the special theory of relativity (STR)? I shall argue that if the relevant change or creation is 
not local, i.e. does not have the same spacetime location as the declaration itself, the answer is 
No.12  
Consider the marking of exam papers. When an authorized examiner assigns a grade to 
a student’s script (and thereby to the student), in accordance with the marking scheme, say by 
signing a certain physical document or by entering information into a computer system, that 
act can be interpreted as an extra-linguistic declaration of the following form:  
 
 
10 Thus, for Searle, successful declarations and performatives have truth values, pace the view of performatives 
originally developed by Austin (Searle 1989: 540, 553; cf. Austin 1956/1979; 1962: 5, passim). Talk of features, 
objects or facts being “created” is also absent from Austin’s writings. In general, Austin focuses on performative 
or illocutionary acts, not on the ontology of the results of such acts. 
11 Compare Searle’s own remarks: “The limitation on performatives [and declarations] is provided by the fact 
that only a tiny number of changes can be brought about in the world solely by saying that one is making those 
changes by that very utterance. For nonsupernaturally endowed human beings, these fall into two classes: the 
creation of purely linguistic institutional facts […] and extralinguistic institutional facts […] [A]ny verb at all 
which names an intentional action could be uttered performatively. The limitations on the class that determine 
which will succeed and which will fail derive from facts about how the world works” (Searle 1989: 554-555, 
557, my emphasis). 
12 Why has not anyone addressed this issue before (although see my 2014a and forthcoming for some brief 
remarks)? I guess most social ontologists are simply not very interested in STR and have therefore neglected the 
issue. And some might think that considerations from STR – a theory from natural science – are irrelevant to 
social ontology. I maintain that they are highly relevant.   
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I declare: NN is hereby assigned grade Y in subject S. 
 
The examiner’s declaration certainly makes it true that the student has acquired the relevant 
grade in the relevant subject. And Searle would in all likelihood regard the grading as an 
imposition of a “status function”, since the grade (we may suppose) gives the student new 
deontic powers, such as being entitled to enroll on an advanced course in the same subject (cf. 
Searle’s discussions of convicted criminals, 1975/1979: 20; 1995: 50).13 
Suppose now that the acquisition of the grade involves a genuine change in the world 
(beyond the agreed physical and mental changes): an instance of an institutional feature or 
property, grade Y (a “status function”), is created. It is instantiated by the relevant student, a, 
and in this way a worldly institutional fact – a’s having grade Y – corresponding to the 
propositional content of the declaration is created. On this construal, it is natural to suppose 
that the change involving a is an effect of the declaration, and that the grading and acquisition 
of the grade are a cause-and-effect pair (I will later discuss the possibility that they are related 
by an ontological dependence or grounding relation). Indeed, in his (1983) Searle explicitly 
defends a causal interpretation of declarations: 
 
…what is [a person] trying to do when he makes a declaration? He is trying to cause 
something to be the case by representing it as being the case. More precisely, he is 
trying to cause a change in the world […] in the case of directives, commissives, and 
declarations, the utterance, if satisfied, will in various ways function causally in the 
production of the state of affairs it represents. (Searle 1983: 172-173, emphasis in 
original)14  
  
However, since the acquisition of the grade occurs simultaneously with the grading, or its 
official completion, the relevant relata must be related by simultaneous causation if they are 
causally related.15 Worse, since the student and the act of grading are likely to be located in 
different places, the relevant causation will involve events that are both simultaneous and 
 
13 Prima facie, the having of the grade might even involve causal potency: the grade might cause the student to 
lead a good – or if the grade is fail, a miserable – life. See Section 5 for an assessment of this idea. 
14 See also sociologist Dave Elder-Vass (2012: 62-64) who, quite approvingly, interprets Searle’s theory in 
causal terms. 
15 In Section 4, I discuss cases that prima facie involve backward assignment of grade, from the point of view of 
the grader. 
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separated in space.16 But that is ruled out by STR: it says that no causal process can 
propagate outside the future light cone of an originating event – that is, no causal process can 
propagate faster than the speed of light, which is a constant and finite magnitude 
(299 792 458 m/s) across all reference frames (e.g. Taylor and Wheeler 1992: 171, 181-
182).17 Thus, if Status Function Declarations are supposed to bring about their simultaneous 
worldly changes by causal processes, the theory is straightforwardly at odds with STR 
(assuming non-locality).18  
A causal interpretation of synchronic declarational creation of institutional facts thus 
seems doomed. And, in his (1989), Searle appears to have changed his mind about the 
generative means, although he does not explain why. He now says:  
 
In order intentionally to produce changes in the world through our actions, normally our 
bodily movements have to set off a chain of ordinary physical causation. […] But there 
is an important class of actions where intention, bodily movement and desired effect are 
not related by physical causation in this way. If somebody says, “The meeting is 
adjourned,” “I pronounce you husband and wife,” “War is declared,” or “You’re fired,” 
he may succeed in changing the world in the ways specified in these utterances just by 
performing the relevant speech acts. […] the difference between pounding a nail and 
adjourning a meeting is that in the case of adjourning the meeting the intention to 
perform the action, as manifested in the appropriate bodily movement (in this case the 
appropriate utterance) performed by a person duly authorized, and recognized by the 
 
16 The student may even have travelled to the other side of the Earth – or to the Moon, or whatnot, if a futuristic 
sci-fi scenario is entertained – when the official grading occurs. Thus, the distance between the grading and the 
putative acquisition of the grade might, in principle, be quite significant. 
17 For philosophical discussions of this speed-limit for causal propagation, see e.g. Reichenbach (1958), Salmon 
(1984), Mellor (1995), and Dowe (2000). See also my (2017) for critical discussion of Mumford and Anjum’s 
recent endorsement of simultaneous power-causation (Mumford and Anjum 2011). 
18 This objection presupposes that causation is understood in terms of a continuous process connecting distinct 
events or worldly facts, which may seem obviously absurd in a case like the above. What if causation is taken 
instead to consist in mere counterfactual dependence between distinct events (e.g. Lewis 1973 – a view not 
endorsed by Searle, who characterizes causation in traditional non-Humean “efficient causation” terms, see e.g. 
Searle 1983: 135; 2001: 41)? Prima facie, counterfactual dependence obtains in the example in question, i.e. 
between the examiner’s grading and the student’s acquisition of the grade. However, if the counterfactual 
dependence at issue concerns spatially separated but simultaneous events, Lewis tended to treat the dependence 
as non-causal: his diagnosis was that one of the events is, in all likelihood, “predominantly extrinsic” (here, 
presumably, a’s acquisition of grade Y). According to Lewis, causation relates distinct events which are 
“predominantly intrinsic” (Lewis 1986b: 263-264). My own diagnosis of the putative counterfactual dependence 
between declarations and their results (to anticipate what is to come in Section 4) is that the results (such as a’s 
acquisition of grade Y) are in fact mere Cambridge changes; they do not even involve extrinsic properties, if 
extrinsic properties are understood as monadic (but relation-dependent) ontological correlates to monadic 
predicates (cf. Armstrong 1997: 91-93). 
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audience, is constitutive of bringing about the desired change. (Searle 1989: 547-548, 
my emphasis)  
  
Searle here seems to be suggesting that declarations – or the intentions behind them, and the 
collective recognition of them19 – and their associated changes are related, not by causation, 
but by a relation of constitution. However, since he also denies, as we saw in Sect. 2, that 
institutional phenomena are located in people’s minds (2010: 17), this “constitution relation” 
cannot be conceived of in terms of identity. Rather, it seems that Searle is here alluding to a 
non-causal, asymmetric ontological dependence relation – in contemporary terms, to a 
grounding relation (see e.g. Schaffer 2009; forthcoming) – obtaining between non-identical 
phenomena (x grounds y is simply the converse of y depends ontologically on x).20 An 
account in terms of grounding is, at least prima facie, more appropriate, since, in contrast to 
causation, grounding is standardly taken to be a paradigmatically synchronic relation (see e.g. 
Bernstein 2016). 
Our question, then, is whether an account of Searlean declarational generation of 
institutional facts framed in terms of asymmetric ontological dependence or grounding is 
compatible with STR. I shall argue that the answer to this question is in the negative. 
Apart from the fact that it is unclear what the mechanisms, if any, of grounding are 
supposed to be, a grounding account21 of declarational generation of institutional facts still 
faces the issue of simultaneity and spatial separateness: the relevant Status Function 
Declaration and the change in the world (the event of creation) are supposed to be 
simultaneous, and if the entity which acquires the status function is located at some place 
differing from the place of the Status Function Declaration, then, trivially, the declaration and 
the change are spatially separated. Thus, this kind of case is in an important respect different 
from the paradigmatic examples of grounding discussed in the grounding literature – wholes 
grounded in their parts, mental states grounded in brain states, tropes grounded in substances, 
sets grounded in their members – where the grounded phenomena are, typically, taken to be 
 
19 Searle elsewhere clarifies that the collective recognition need not always be recognition of a specific event 
(e.g. of a specific declaration occurring at a certain place at a certain time) or of a particular object’s status 
function; it may suffice that the collective recognition concerns general constitutive rules – “standing 
declarations” with general content (2010: 97) – which back up various singular declarations or the having of a 
status-function by a certain object (see e.g. Searle 2010: 102-103; see also Searle 1995: 32-33; and 1975/1979: 
19-20).   
20  Indeed, in his (2010: 4), Searle says that “social institutions such as governments and corporations are 
dependent on and derived from the mental phenomena and behavior of individual human beings.” (my emphasis) 
21 I follow Schaffer (2009; forthcoming) in allowing the relata of grounding to belong to different categories of 
being, i.e. they need not be facts.  
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co-located with their grounds. Now, according to STR, it is a relative matter whether or not 
events which are spatially separated and exist in each other’s “absolute elsewhere” – i.e. 
outside the lightcone of the other event in question – are simultaneous: events that are 
simultaneous in one reference system are not simultaneous in another system if the latter is 
moving at high speed relative to the former (e.g. Taylor and Wheeler 1992: 62-63, 181). This 
is a problem for a grounding account of Searlean generation of worldly institutional facts by 
Status Function Declarations, because unless the account treats the relevant grounding as 
something that is in some reference frames directed backward in time – which is highly 
counterintuitive and violates Searle’s simultaneity requirement22 – it will have to insist that 
the relevant events are simultaneous in all reference frames, in violation of STR. 
Consider Spacetime Diagram 1. In it, a student, a, and an examiner, b, who are spatially 
separated but (approximately) stationary relative to each other, are depicted. During the time 
interval shown they agree on the simultaneity of events: they slice up spacetime into the same 
set of simultaneity planes (or times or hyperplanes of spacetime). The grading, e, and the 
acquisition of the grade, e´, happen at the same time according to them, namely t1.23 However, 
in the diagram, a third person, c, moving uniformly at a very high speed relative to a and b, 
towards them along their x-axis, is also depicted (I consider a futuristic sci-fi scenario with the 
purpose of making a philosophical point). Person c’s planes of simultaneity are at an angle to 
a’s and b’s planes of simultaneity. In particular, according to c, event e´ occurs before event 
e! But if e´ depends on e, then e’s grounding or generation of e´ is directed backward in time 
in c’s reference frame. Such a scenario, involving backward grounding of a real, worldly 
institutional property, will, I take it, be generally rejected by social ontologists24: how could a 
person or object, relative to a certain frame of reference, acquire a worldly institutional 
property before the relevant declaration has occurred? Such backward grounding seems 
 
22 In some reference frames, the relevant grounding relation will be directed forward in time, which is not as 
counterintuitive as backward grounding but which nevertheless violates the simultaneity requirement. 
23 Of course, the student will not know that the grading has occurred until sometime later, when a causal signal 
about the content of the grading has reached her; but at the later time she can deduce that the grading occurred at 
t1 and that she therefore acquired the grade at t1 (given the assumption that the acquisition of the grade is, in her 
reference system, synchronically grounded in the grading). 
24 Admittedly, Schaffer is probably an exception: he proclaims that “there is no problem whatsoever in positing 
‘non-local’ grounding connections across space and time” (forthcoming). But I think many will find backward 
grounding of real, worldly properties a highly troublesome and counterintuitive notion. I should also mention in 
this connection that Brian Epstein holds that his “framing relations” (which are not grounding relations, 
according to him) between rules (or “framing principles”) and worldly institutional facts apply across times and 
even worlds (2015: 77-78, 123-124); but he never explains how this could be the case.  
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almost as weird as backward causation. Certainly, scenarios like this will be rejected by 
anyone who, like Searle, is already committed to the simultaneity requirement.25  
 
Spacetime Diagram 1. Events e and e´ do not occur simultaneously according to observer c. Specifically, e´ 
occurs before e in c’s frame of reference. (y- and z-dimensions, and light-cone structures, are not displayed in the 
diagram.) 
 
To avoid (relative) backward (but also forward, see notes 22 and 25) grounding of worldly 
institutional facts, a defender of an ontological dependence account will have to insist, against 
STR, that e and e´ are simultaneous in all reference frames (i.e. relative to all observers, 
including a, b and c). A natural way of defending such a view would be to say that we inhabit 
a Newtonian spacetime with absolute simultaneity relations, and maintain (in line with the 
reasoning of Prior 1996/1998; Craig 2000, Ch. 5; Tooley 1997, Ch. 11; Craig and Smith 
2008) that the relative simultaneity planes of STR are mere artefacts of certain contingent, 
operational definitions of temporal and spatial intervals, and account for the classical 
Michelson-Morley and the Kennedy-Thorndike experiments (which support the notion that 
the speed of light is a constant) in terms of absolute clock retardation and absolute shrinking 
of measuring rods, in the manner pioneered by Hendrik Lorentz (see his papers in Einstein at 
al., 1952).  
 
25 Searle’s notion that declarations have a “double direction of fit” arguably also breaks down – or ceases to 
have application across reference frames – in a scenario like this. If, according to observer c, the student a 
already has acquired the worldly institutional feature when the declaration occurs, then b’s declaration appears to 
have merely a word-to-world direction of fit, ¯, in c’s reference frame (even if the declaration, in c’s reference 
frame, also allegedly grounds the pre-existing state of affairs, backward in time). Similarly – although the other 
way round – for someone moving away from a and b at high velocity: since the relevant worldly institutional 
state of affairs is, in this reference frame, created after b’s declaration, arguably b’s declaration has merely a 
world-to-word direction of fit, ­, in this frame of reference. (Compare: according to Searle, commissives and 
directives have merely a world-to-word direction of fit, ­, even if they, in a sense, both describe and generate the 
intended future state of affairs. See Sect. 2 above.)  
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Such a view is very unattractive. As is well known, to date no satisfactory explanation 
of why physical processes slow down (absolutely) and material objects contract (absolutely) 
when moving relative to the absolute rest frame, assuming such a frame exists, has been 
provided. Without such an explanation, the Newtonian/Lorentzian theory looks seriously ad 
hoc. By contrast, the purely relative time dilations and length contractions of STR follow 
from the postulates of the theory (see Sklar 1974, Ch. IV, B for discussion of the rival theories 
of Lorentz and Einstein).  
A further problem, and one that applies specifically to the issue of institutional reality, 
is as follows. Defenders of a grounding account who insist that events such as e (i.e. 
declarations made by humans on earth) and e´ (the changes created by such declarations) are 
not only relatively but absolutely simultaneous are apparently committed to the notion that 
earthlings are absolutely at rest relative to absolute space (at least approximately, or for brief 
periods of time, so that Earth’s rotation around its axis can be ignored), although there is no 
way of empirically confirming that such a situation obtains, due to absolute time dilations and 
length contractions.26 Earth’s being at rest relative to absolute space would seem to be an 
extraordinary coincidence in need of explanation and theoretical support. It cannot be simply 
assumed.27  
In short, the Newtonian understanding of space and time is both archaic and introduces 
added explanatory burdens and complications. With this in mind, I will assume from here on 
that the absolute simultaneity option is not on the table for Searleans. Moreover, the issue of 
the relevant generative mechanism would be left unresolved within such a framework.28 
The lesson of the discussion in this section, then, is not that STR is false. Nor, in my 
view, should we conclude that the relevant results of Status Function Declarations are effects 
or events that happen absolutely after the declarations, i.e. within the future light cone of the 
 
26 Of course, if acquisitions of status functions were themselves directly empirically detectable – e.g. if status 
functions brought new physical causal powers to their subjects – then, assuming their “creation” is absolutely 
simultaneous with the declarations that create them, their detection could be used to deduce the absolute rest 
frame and the absolute simultaneity relations; and then we would know whether or not Earth is at rest in absolute 
space. But obviously, acquisitions of status functions are not directly empirically detectable – at best, they are 
indirectly “detectable” through the receipt of information (via normal, finite-speed, causal signals or processes) 
about the relevant declaration having taken place.     
27 On the face of it, within a Newtonian/Lorentzian framework, it is more probable that we earthlings are in a 
situation in which our relative simultaneity relations do not coincide with the absolute simultaneity relations – 
because Earth is moving relative to absolute space, perhaps at a very high speed – so that events such as e´ 
happen (in relative, earthly time) either after or before the declarations which, in absolute time, synchronically 
generate them, depending on how Earth moves relative to absolute space. 
28 Thus, I wholeheartedly agree with Nikk Effingham (2009: 253) when he says: “I think it is strange that merely 
speaking and intoning certain phrases could cause [or ground] anything to exist (except, of course, for the words 
and intonations themselves). […] The thought is that only wizards and warlocks can bring things into existence 
by merely uttering a few phrases.” See also Zimmerman (2002: 333-334), and Smit and Buekens (2017: 240). 
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relevant declarations. For while that view would be compatible with STR, it would violate 
Searle’s simultaneity requirement – an intuitively plausible thesis which I think should be 
retained, in some form or another, if possible.29, 30 Thus, I think the most plausible conclusion 
of the foregoing discussion is that Status Function Declarations do not genuinely change 
anything in the world (the agreed physical and mental changes apart): such declarations bring 
nothing “extralinguistic” into existence; they do not create institutional properties, or 
institutional objects; they do not create worldly institutional facts. The acquisition of a grade 
by a student, for example, is not a genuine event, taking place at a certain location; it does not 
involve a genuine change in a subject. 
 
4. Mere Cambridge change and institutional truths 
If the acquisition of a grade is not a genuine event, what is it? Students do, after all, acquire 
grades – that can hardly be denied. I shall argue that acquisitions of (putative) institutional 
features or properties (“status functions”) should be thought of as so-called “mere Cambridge 
events” (cf. Kim 1974: 48). Such events involve “mere Cambridge change”: a monadic 
predicate becomes applicable (or ceases to be applicable) to an object in virtue of changes 
that happen elsewhere. The “creation” of full institutional objects, I shall argue, should be 
understood in similar terms: existential, institutional statements or propositions become true 
(if present-tensed), but the truth-makers for such truths do not involve ontic institutional 
objects existing in the world. 
The term “mere Cambridge change” was coined by Peter Geach in his book God and 
the Soul (1969), where he discussed the following Cambridge criterion of change, based on 
the work of Bertrand Russell and Ellis McTaggart (e.g. Russell 1903: 469; McTaggart 1927: 
14): 
 
The thing called “x” has changed if we have “F(x) at time t” true and “F(x) at time t1” 
false, for some interpretation of “F”, “t”, and “t1”. (Geach 1969: 71-72)  
 
29 In section 4, I address some possible exceptions to the simultaneity thesis – but these will turn out to be quite 
harmless on my preferred “mere Cambridge change” account.  
30 Note that if a simultaneity view is accepted, so-called “social mechanisms” accounts (e.g. Hindriks 2017) 
cannot be defended by institutional realists as problem-solvers: such accounts explicitly involve causal processes 
propagating at slower-than-light speed (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting such accounts as 
potential problem-solvers). Nor can Smit and Buekens’s (2017) deflationary “incentivization” account be 
endorsed as a fully satisfactory account of declarations (although I agree with much of what is said in this paper), 
since it too relies on causal processes (e.g. pp. 244-245); thereby it denies that declarations can synchronically 




Geach pointed out that this criterion gives the odd result that a person a “changes” when she 
comes to be shorter than another person b in virtue of the latter’s growth. For a monadic 
predicate, “is shorter than b”, becomes true of a having not been true of a at an earlier time. 
This is not a genuine or real change in the person a, according to Geach: it is a mere 
Cambridge change. The predicate “is shorter than b” comes to apply to a solely as a result of 
a genuine change that happens to someone else, b, somewhere else (see also Kim 1974; 
Shoemaker 1980/1997; Mellor 1998: 87-88).31 
This diagnosis applies quite straightforwardly, I think, to the cases where an 
institutional property (or “status function”) is imposed on, or ascribed to, a pre-existing object 
(cf. Searle 2010: 99). Consider our example of grading again. An examiner declares, at a 
certain place, and at a certain time (relative to, say, his own frame of reference), that student a 
has acquired grade Y in subject S. The examiner’s act of writing or typing is a genuine change 
in the world, with a location. Given that the examiner is duly authorized,32 and as long as the 
relevant rules and requirements regarding grading have been followed, an institutional 
predicate33 of the form “has acquired grade Y in subject S” becomes true of student a – and it 
does so irrespective of a’s whereabouts. Since this predicate is now true of the student (in the 
examiner’s reference frame), it can be truly said that the student has, from this time onwards, 
a new institutional “status”. She is now entitled to enroll on a new course, etc. It can even be 
said that the student has acquired a new institutional property, as long as “property” is 
 
31 Note also that the two-place predicate “is shorter than” (contrast the monadic predicate “is shorter than b”) is 
typically regarded as a predicate which expresses a mere “internal relation” (see e.g. Armstrong 2004: 50): the 
predicate applies in a certain case not in virtue of the existence of an ontic shorter-than relation instantiated by 
objects x and y, but in virtue of the way x and y themselves are – i.e. in virtue of their respective spatial 
extensions. Also, the truth-making relation holding between some suitable portion of the world and a true 
contingent statement of the form “a is F” (or proposition of the form <a is F>) is arguably an internal relation: 
given the statement’s content and the existence of the relevant portion of the world, the statement is thereby 
made true (for defenses of truth-making as an internal relation, see e.g. Armstrong 2004: 9, 50; Heil 2012: 156, 
160-162). In a similar manner, it seems plausible to hold that a statement of the form “the predicate ‘F’ applies 
to object a” (or a proposition of the form <the predicate ‘F” applies to object a>) is made true simply by the 
meaningful predicate and some suitable portion of the world of which the relevant object a is a part – the truth-
maker need not also involve some external applying-relation (or satisfying-relation) holding between the 
meaningful predicate and object a. If this is correct, then an occurrence of mere Cambridge change need not 
even involve the coming into existence of some external ontic relation.  
32 That is, given that the predicate “is authorized” applies to the person for reasons similar to those described in 
the text regarding how the predicate “has acquired grade Y” applies to the student. It is difficult to account for all 
the apparent status functions in terms of mere Cambridge change in a single go. Thus, I am not here attempting 
to provide a reductive analysis of “has acquired grade Y”; rather I am trying to paint a picture of what goes on 
ontologically when someone acquires a grade. The idea, of course, is that similar considerations apply to other 
putative cases of status function impositions: they involve, not genuine creations and changes, as Searle and 
others apparently claim, but mere Cambridge changes.    
33 Alternatively, we can put the idea in terms of a concept which becomes applicable to the student, or which is 
such that the student begins to fall under it. 
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understood merely in the weak, abundant sense discussed by philosophers such as Lewis 
(1986a: 59-60), Mellor (1995: 157-159, 185), Bird (1997: 9-12), and Heil (2012: 23-24), 
according to which, roughly, an object x has a “property” F if predicate “F” applies to x.34 
What the student has not acquired, however, is a property in a strong, sparse (or ontic) sense 
(ibid.): nothing actually happened to the student or in the student’s whereabouts. In this sense, 
the acquisition of the grade is not a genuine event, but a mere Cambridge event involving 
mere Cambridge change. 
If “acquisition” of a grade is a mere Cambridge event, the difficulties with STR vanish. 
No causal process propagates from the declaration to the student at a speed faster than light; 
no sparse, ontic institutional property of the student, located within the absolute elsewhere of 
the declaration, gets grounded by the declaration.35 Rather, a mere predicate becomes true of 
the student, as a result of the declaration. The predicate, moreover, can be taken to become 
true of the student at the time of the declaration – i.e. simultaneously with the declaration – in 
all reference frames without any need to postulate absolute simultaneity relations. In the 
reference frame of the student and the examiner, the predicate “has grade Y” becomes true of 
the student at time t1 (although the student may not be aware of this at t1) (see Spacetime 
Diagram 1); but in the reference frame of observer c, the predicate can be taken to become 
true of the student at the simultaneity plane indicated by the drawn x´-axis in Spacetime 
Diagram 1. This scenario does not involve the paradoxical situation that there is a single, 
genuine event e´ (a’s acquisition of the grade Y) that succeeds in being located at two distinct 
places in spacetime (see Spacetime Diagram 2) – which, of course, would be impossible.  
 
 
34 Strictly speaking, Lewis understands abundant properties in terms of set-theoretic constructions of objects 
(ibid.). 
35 For the record: I think such a view should be avoided even if grounding is taken to be an internal, or even 
superinternal, relation (cf. Bennett 2011). The notion that a sparse, ontic, worldly institutional property (or 
object or fact) can be grounded by a Status Function Declaration is simply fantastic, irrespective of the ontic 
status of the grounding relation itself. Note, however, that sometimes grounding is characterized as an external 
relation (e.g. Schaffer 2009: 354-355, 372), i.e. as a relation which is an “entity” over and above its relata – 
somewhat analogously to how causation is standardly taken to be an external relation. On such a view of 
grounding, the putative grounding of institutional facts becomes even more troublesome, especially within a 
relativistic context. Also, observe that if grounding is an external relation, then truth-making cannot plausibly be 
held to be a species of grounding (as is suggested, e.g., by Schaffer 2010), because truth-making is arguably an 
internal relation (see note 31 above). For further discussion of the problems with analyzing truth-making in 
terms of grounding, see Tahko (2013) and Griffith (2014).     
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Spacetime Diagram 2. One and the same event, e´, is depicted as being located twice over in spacetime. 
 
Rather, the claim is that no genuine event e´ occurs at all. This more modest interpretation 
simply involves the notion that “the acquisition of the grade Y” is to be understood in terms 
of a predication which is relativized, or indexed, to a reference frame with its own planes of 
simultaneity or times (see Spacetime Diagram 3).  
 
Spacetime Diagram 3. The predicate “has grade Y” becomes true of a, because of b’s declaration e, at distinct 
simultaneity planes of spacetime, according to a and b, and c, respectively.  
 
Similar considerations apply, I submit, to other impositions of putative status functions to pre-
existing objects through declarations: to someone’s appointment as president, promotion to a 
professorship, or sentencing to a term in prison.36 
 
36 Thus, if sci-fi scenarios involving high-speed interstellar travel ever become a reality, regulations will need to 
specify what frame of reference should take precedence in cases involving persons and objects moving at high 
speed relative to each other, on pain of future individuals having to face irresolvable legal controversies.  
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This mere-Cambridge-change account also enables us to make sense of the special cases 
where declarations are directed towards the past from the point of view of the one who is 
performing the declaration.37 Consider grading yet again. In the Swedish university system 
(and in the Dutch, I am told), grades are often assigned retrospectively: a student completes 
an assignment on a certain date t, but a busy professor grades the assignment at a later date t´ 
and in so doing gives the student an official grade which is valid from the earlier time t 
onwards. If something was really created at t by the declaration at t´, we would have a case of 
backward causation or grounding – but this time, within the past light cone of the declaration 
(i.e. within the so-called absolute past of the declaration, entailing that the acquisition of the 
grade occurs before the declaration in all reference frames). By contrast, on the mere-
Cambridge-change view a mere predicate of the form “has grade Y” becomes true of the 
student, in virtue of the declaration at t´. The student does not genuinely change as a result of 
the declaration. Interestingly, though, on the assumption that the B-theory of time is correct – 
according to which all events (i.e. events deemed “future”, “present” or “past” from the point 
of view of someone existing in spacetime) are equally real38 – the present-tensed predicate 
“has grade Y” is true of the student already at time t, owing to the existence of the later, past-
directed declaration at t´. However, at t the declaration is epistemologically inaccessible to 
everyone, so at that time no one acts on its “consequences”; but the institutional predicate is 
nevertheless true of the student at t, on this worldview.39  Thus, the genuine change or event 
(i.e. the making of the relevant past-directed declaration) occurs at time t´, and the “result” of 
that event is a mere Cambridge change concerning a predicate which, on the B-theory of time, 
is true of the student at t and onwards, but not at times before t. After t´, of course, the 
declaration gradually becomes epistemologically accessible to the relevant society at large, 
and people, including the student, start behaving in accordance with it (cf. Sect. 5 below).  
So far, I have been discussing the imposition of an institutional property or “status 
function” to a pre-existing physical object. I have not yet addressed the alleged creation of 
institutional objects such as corporations (i.e. instances of so-called free-standing Y-terms) 
 
37 Thanks to Frank Hindriks for drawing my attention to this interesting phenomenon, which is neglected by 
Searle. Hindriks would not agree with my account of the phenomenon, though (see Hindriks, ms). 
38 The special theory of relativity seems to require the truth of the B-theory of time – see Putnam (1967) for an 
influential argument for this conclusion. For further discussion and references, see Mellor (1998), Sider (2001) 
and my (2009). 
39 I assume here that during the time span in question people in the relevant society accept “standing 
declarations” with general content, authorizing the professor’s grading, in line with what is said in footnotes 6 
and 19 above.  
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through Status Function Declarations.40 About this second variety of institutional creation, 
Searle writes: 
 
In this case we seem to have created a remarkably potent object, a limited liability 
corporation, so to speak out of thin air. No pre-existing object was operated on to turn it 
into a corporation. Rather, we simply made it the case by fiat, by Declaration, that the 
corporation exists. (Searle 2010: 98)41  
 
I think the idea that an object is literally created in this way needs to be avoided. It is better to 
adapt the mere-Cambridge-change account of institutional properties and apply it to objects. 
On this account, a declaration to the effect that a corporation exists is made, and because of 
this declaration it becomes true to say, in a tensed language and within a suitable reference 
frame, “A corporation, founded in such and such a way, exists”.42 The truth-maker for such an 
existential assertion, however, should not be taken to be a new, ontic, institutional object that 
is somehow brought into existence in the world (perhaps, at its “institutional location”, cf. 
Hindriks 2013: 418) simultaneously with the declaration. That would lead to difficulties of the 
kind discussed above. Rather, the truth-maker (or truth-makers) should be assumed to consist 
simply of the declaration itself, together with representations of the relevant legal regulation.43 
In effect, I am suggesting that the institutional object case is in an important respect 
similar to many of the so-called deflationary cases discussed in the truth-maker literature (e.g. 
Armstrong 2004: 33). These involve existential statements which are made true by entities 
ostensibly quite different from the entity claimed to exist. For example, Hugh Mellor (2012: 
98-99) argues that true existential propositions about rainbows, such as <there is a rainbow 
east of car c driving north>, are not made true by peculiar rainbow-entities with remarkable 
 
40 Elsewhere (Hansson Wahlberg 2014a), I have argued that, strictly speaking, a physical object or person X who 
comes to satisfy an institutional sortal predicate Y can also be said to be an “institutional object”. Here, 
however, I reserve the term for the so-called free-standing-Y-term cases (e.g. Searle 2010: 98).  
41 Searle quotes the California Code regarding corporations in support of his view: “Section 200A: ‘One or more 
natural persons, partnerships, associations or corporations, domestic or foreign, may form a corporation under 
this division by executing and filing articles of incorporation.’ Section C: ‘The corporate existence begins upon 
the filing of the articles and continues perpetually, unless otherwise expressly provided by law or in the 
articles’” (Searle 2010: 97, italics original). 
42 At least, it is true to say this up to the time of the corporation’s “termination”, which often consists in another 
declaration. Using a tenseless language – in which “exists” means, roughly, “existed, exists now, or will exist” – 
it will be true to say this at any time, assuming the B-theory of time is correct. The truth-maker(s) can then be 
located in some past, present or future region of spacetime, from the point of view of the time of the statement.  
43 Perhaps the truth-maker should be expanded to include other circumstances as well, such as the history of the 
founders, etc. The key point is that it should not be taken to consist of a new entity which is somehow brought 
into existence in the world simultaneously with the declaration. 
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properties (in the example in question, a rainbow that keeps pace with c as it moves north); 
they are made true by sunlight-reflecting raindrops. Similarly, David Armstrong (2004: 137-
142) argues that true existential propositions about dispositions are made true by categorical 
properties governed by contingent laws of nature, not by ontic dispositions or so-called 
powers. And John Heil (2012: 19, 153-155; forthcoming) argues that propositions (or 
“judgments”) about macroscopic objects are made true by micro particles appropriately 
arranged, not by macro-objects.44 Similarly, my suggestion is that existential propositions or 
statements concerning corporations, and other institutional objects, are not made true by ontic 
institutional objects, but by declarations and other human activities and representations.45 
All in all, I think it is deeply problematic (and certainly highly misleading, if Searle 
does not want his claims to be taken literally) to maintain that we have an “amazing” or 
“quasi-magical” ability to “create” institutional facts – non-identical with mental states and 
true propositions – “corresponding” to the content of extralinguistic declarations. Rather, we 
should simply maintain that in virtue of the declarations, predicates that formerly did not 
apply to a certain object or set of objects come to apply to the object or sets of objects; and 
that in virtue of the declarations it becomes possible to quantify over institutional objects, at 
least in certain types of discourse.46 Thus, saying so can indeed make it so, as Austin (1962: 
7) originally taught us; but not because declarations create worldly, extralinguistic, 
institutional facts corresponding to their propositional contents, but rather because 
declarations “create” institutional truths and are themselves one of the truth-makers for those 
truths. With some provisos (see below), it would appear that Searle is in the grip of a 
misunderstanding: he seems to think that institutional truths must be made true by extra-
linguistic institutional facts. 
I want to end this section by acknowledging that, in spite of numerous formulations 
suggesting the contrary, Searle might in the end agree with my core ontological point that 
 
44 I am not necessarily endorsing all of these non-institutional examples. I am merely using them to illustrate the 
main idea. 
45 At this point, the reader might worry: Are not speech acts such as declarations a kind of institutional 
phenomenon generated by constitutive rules (cf. Searle 1969)? If so, how can they be (constituents of) truth-
makers? My answer: it may indeed be that we should take the ultimate truth-makers here to be utterances or 
inscribings of words (cf. Austin’s “phatic acts”, 1962: 95) and various representations of semantic rules, but I 
think the main arguments and conclusions of the present paper can be set out without settling this specific issue. 
In the paper I also wish to remain uncommitted on how language itself works. (For Searle’s take on the 
difference between the generation of illocutionary acts and extra-linguistic institutional reality, see his 2010: 14, 
110-115.)   
46 That is, in ordinary, legal and social science discourse, but arguably not when advancing metaphysical 
existence claims, in a discourse about truth-makers, conducted in Ontologese, as it were (cf. Mellor 2009/2012: 
99-100; Heil 2012: 165-167; Sider 2011: 171).  
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nothing is really created in the world when we perform Status Function Declarations. In The 
Construction of Social Reality (1995) and Making the Social World (2010), Searle says that 
institutional features are “ontologically subjective” (1995: 10; 2010: 18) because they are 
“intentionality-relative” (2010: 17) or “observer-relative features of the world” (1995: 9 ff.). 
In Speech Acts (1969: 103-106), he defends a version of predicate nominalism with regard to 
the ontology of properties (cf. Armstrong 1978: 12-14). Clearly, a predicate nominalist 
account of putative institutional properties would combine very well with the mere-
Cambridge-change view defended above.47 Also, in Speech Acts (1969: 52) and in The 
Construction of Social Reality (1995: 28), Searle puts a lot of emphasis on the role of 
constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y” in the “construction” of institutional “reality”. 
Saying that something X counts as a Y sounds a lot more innocent – especially within 
predicate nominalism – than saying “in the nonlinguistic Status Function Declaration, we do 
more than represent: we create” (Searle 2010: 114), or “We (or I) make it the case by 
Declaration that the Y status function exists” (ibid: 101). I also want to point out that in 
Making the Social World, Searle remarks, in passing, about corporations, that:  
 
…we need to specify not just that the [status] function exists but that there is an entity 
Y, the corporation, that has the function, even though the entity is, as they say, a 
“fictitious” entity. […] On the standard accounts of the semantics of quantificational 
logic, the quantifiers range over a domain of existing objects. But in the case of the 
creation of entities that have status functions, there is no such domain. (Searle 2010: 
100, 120)48  
 
Moreover, in The Construction of Social Reality, Searle denies that the “correspondence” in 
the correspondence theory of truth – a theory which Searle defends in Ch. 9 of the book – 
needs to involve “resemblance” or “isomorphism” between statements and facts (1995: 213-
214). 
It is unclear what we should make of these claims and doctrines, however. To say that 
something is intentionality-relative or mind-dependent, or even ontologically subjective, is 
 
47 The predicate nominalism endorsed in Speech Acts is defended as a doctrine about properties in general, not as 
a doctrine restricted to institutional properties. By contrast, I have merely been arguing that creation of 
institutional “properties” is best understood on the model of mere Cambridge change. Searle does not discuss 
mere Cambridge change.  
48 And in his (2014: 20; see also 1995: 36; 2003: 302-303), Searle maintains: “’Objects’ that figure in 
Institutional Facts are typically placeholders for patterns of activity. Think of corporations, money, and 
vacations.” (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer here.)     
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not necessarily to say that it does not belong to the furniture of the universe and does not 
really exist. Jonathan Schaffer (2009), for example, argues that ontologically dependent or 
grounded entities – mind-dependent entities included (ibid: 362) – are as real or existent as 
the entities they depend upon. Searle himself says, about pains and intentions, that they are 
“ontologically subjective” in that “they exist only as experienced by human or animal 
subjects” (Searle 2010: 18), but he nevertheless maintains that mental states are “features of 
reality” (Searle 1995: 12). And, crucially, if saying that something is ontologically subjective 
is to say that it does not really exist, how could institutional facts, being held to be 
ontologically subjective, be said to be truth-makers for institutional truths (e.g. Searle 1995: 
221)? Relatedly, how could Status Function Declarations with their putative double direction 
of fit, ­¯, ever be successful in Searle’s view, if the allegedly fitting relata at the other end, 
the institutional facts created, were strictly speaking non-existent?  
Moreover, it is unclear whether Searle is still a predicate nominalist: as far as I know, he 
has not defended predicate nominalism since Speech Acts (1969) and has never mentioned 
predicate nominalism in connection with status functions. In Making the Social World (2010), 
he has also made it clear that he now thinks the theory of Status Function Declarations is the 
fundamental theory of the “construction” of institutional reality: constitutive rules are to be 
interpreted as various forms of “standing declarations” with double direction of fit (e.g. Searle 
2010: 13, 97). Constitutive rules of the paradigmatic form “X counts as Y in C” are played 
down: Searle maintains that we can create status functions without there being a brute object 
X which is counted as a Y (i.e. in cases of free-standing Y terms; e.g. Searle 2010: 20-21, 97-
102). 
Complicating matters further, although Searle occasionally describes institutional 
objects such as corporations as fictitious entities, he also explicitly maintains, as we have 
seen, that they are “created” and that we make this the case by declarations that they “exist” 
(Searle 2010: 120, 122).49 And although he says that he is not committed to correspondence 
as isomorphism, he does at various places claim that facts are what make true statements true 
(e.g. 1995: 211, 221), that facts have a “structure” (1995: 221), indeed “a propositional 
structure” (2014: 20), and that facts “have to be propositionally specified” (1995: 212), or 
 
49 Searle also says that persons can stand in various relations to status functions, free-standing status functions 
included: “We (or I) make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in doing so we (or I) 
create a relation R between Y and a certain person or persons, S, such that in virtue of SRY, S has the power to 
perform acts (of type) A” (ibid.: 101-102; see also p. 98). Prima facie, the existence of relations requires the 
existence of relata, such as corporations. Searle does not qualify his claims by saying that he merely talking 
about true statements about corporations and their relations.  
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alternatively, “can only be stated and not named” (1995: 211). All of which strongly suggests 
that facts have an object-property structure somehow mirroring the subject-predicate structure 
of the statements or propositions that specify them and are made true by them.  
Concerning institutional facts, he explicitly says: 
 
Once you see the power of the Declaration to create an institutional reality, a reality of 
governments, universities, marriages, private property, money, and all the rest of it, you 
can see that social reality has a formal structure as simple and elegant as the structure 
of the language used to create it. (Searle 2010: 16, my emphasis) 
 
Such remarks strongly suggest that a Status Function Declaration, whose propositional 
content is of the form “a is F”, brings into existence a corresponding and structurally similar 
institutional fact, a fact of the form a’s being F, where F is an institutional property.   
Be this as it may. If, appearances to the contrary, Searle is defending nothing more than 
a mere-Cambridge-change account of the creation or imposition of “status functions”, if he is, 
more generally, wedded to no more than the notion that our declarations create institutional 
truths, not corresponding worldly institutional facts or states of affairs, then this paper can be 
seen as a friendly plea to him (or to his followers) to explicitly formulate the theory in such 
more modest terms. 
 
5. What Follows?  
If nothing is created by Status Function Declarations except institutional truths, what follows? 
One important implication concerns causation. If the institutional properties, objects and facts 
allegedly created by declarations do not exist in a worldly sense, they cannot be relata of 
causal relations (or any other relations for that matter). Yet, we often speak as if such 
properties/objects/facts have a causal impact or partake in causal processes. We do so in 
everyday speech (“His poor grades caused him to lose his scholarship”, “Money causes more 
harm than good”, “…this was caused by the fact that the company had…” etc.); and the 
academic literature (in philosophy, sociology, political science, etc.) is replete with such 
institutional causal claims.50 And Searle, as we have seen, sometimes seems to suggest that 
 
50 For some recent, metaphysically loaded, examples, see Elder-Vass (2010), Lawson (2013), and Little (2016). 
(Apart from suffering from the kind of difficulties outlined above, these examples are problematic in that they 
involve troublesome notions of intrastructuration, extrinsic positional power, emergence, social structure, and 
downward causation, and in many cases conflate deontic powers with causal powers; for detailed, critical 
discussion, see my 2014b, 2014c and forthcoming.)  
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institutional facts and status functions are causally potent: “facts [in general, institutional facts 
included] function causally in a way that true statements do not” (1995: 206), and “a function 
[status functions included] is a cause with a purpose” (2006: 17; 2010: 59). But again, if status 
functions and institutional facts do not really exist as worldly entities, they cannot be causes.51 
At least, they cannot be what we might call “sparse causes” (in analogy with the distinction 
between sparse/ontic and abundant/predicate-nominalistic properties, see Sect. 4 above). A 
sparse cause, let us say, is an ontic entity that is a relatum of an ontic causal transaction or 
process of some kind. A “mere abundant cause”, let us stipulate, figures as a (putative) cause 
in a true causal statement, without being a sparse cause. To illustrate: it is sometimes argued 
that causal statements involving “absences” and “omissions” as causes can be true, although 
absences and omissions do not exist as worldly or ontic entities (e.g. Mellor 1995, Ch. 13; 
Dowe 2001, Ch. 6; Lewis 2000/2004: 99-102; Woodward 2003: 86-91); on such a view, 
absences and omissions fall out as mere abundant causes, according to the terminology 
suggested here.52 Similarly, one could maintain – in an attempt at rescuing some watered-
down form of institutional causation – that institutional properties/objects/facts can figure as 
mere abundant causes in true, institutional, diachronic causal statements (such as “His poor 
grades caused him to be depressed”, “…caused him to lead a miserable life”, etc.). But 
importantly, if what I have been arguing is correct, the truth-makers for such causal 
statements (assuming they are true) will not involve institutional properties/objects/facts.53 
Rather, the key truth-makers will in many cases, in all likelihood, involve (although certainly 
not exhaustively) people’s mental representations of institutional properties/objects/facts (see 
also my forthcoming). Nothing about what I have said rules out that representations of 
institutional entities can be sparsely causally efficacious and influence the way that people 
feel, reason and behave.54 A detailed positive account of these causal issues will have to wait 
for another occasion, however.55 
 
51 It is often argued that extrinsic properties and events cannot partake in causation (Kim 1974; Shoemaker 
1980/1997; Lewis 1986b: 163-264). Here I am applying the argument to institutional features, and I am, in a 
way, strengthening it by arguing that institutional properties, objects and events (generated by declarations) are 
not merely extrinsic; they do not even exist (in the truth-maker sense). 
52 Note that it is conceptually possible for there to be mere abundant causes that fail to be sparse causes because 
they do not, on the occasion in question, partake in an ontic causal transaction or processes, even though they 
exist in the truth-maker sense. However, there is little reason to assume the existence (in the truth-maker sense) 
of entities that never partake in ontic causal transactions or processes.  
53 Cf. Mellor (1995, Ch. 15) who argues that the truth-makers for true causal propositions are often quite 
different from what they appear to be.   
54 Cf. Searle (2001, Ch. 6), although Searle focuses on external reasons for action. 
55 For now, I wish to be noncommittal about, for example, the exact nature of ontic causal transactions (i.e., 
whether they should be understood in terms of conserved quantities, forces, manifestations of powers, 
counterfactual dependencies between predominantly intrinsic events, etc.) and whether ordinary causal 
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